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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 A bankruptcy trustee sometimes must act quickly to 
safeguard property of the estate. In this case, Chapter 7 
Trustee Lisa Swope took control of a commercial leasehold 
possessed by Phoenician Mediterranean Villa, LLC in a 
building owned by the debtor. Phoenician requested equitable 
relief to regain possession of its leasehold, claiming that 
Swope violated the law when she accepted the key to locks 
that had been changed. The United States Bankruptcy Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania denied the relief 
sought by Phoenician, holding that Swope was qualifiedly 
immune from suit. The District Court affirmed and 
Phoenician filed this appeal.   
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The question presented is whether qualified immunity 
applies to discretionary actions taken by a trustee to preserve 
the bankruptcy estate’s assets, and whether that immunity 
protects Trustee Swope’s conduct in this case. We will affirm 
because Swope exercised reasonable care under the 
circumstances and did not violate clearly established law. 
I 
J & S Properties, LLC filed a Chapter 7 petition in the 
Bankruptcy Court on July 10, 2013. Attorney Lisa Swope was 
appointed as Chapter 7 Trustee of the estate. The estate’s 
largest asset was a building located in Altoona, Pennsylvania, 
in which Phoenician was a lessee and previously operated a 
restaurant. In re J & S Props., LLC, 545 B.R. 91, 94 (Bankr. 
W.D. Pa. 2015). Pursuant to a court order dated November 5, 
2013, Swope rejected Phoenician’s lease to facilitate a sale of 
the property. Although Phoenician was not operating the 
restaurant at that time, its tenancy had not expired. After the 
lease was rejected, Phoenician attempted to remove personal 
property from the restaurant, but Swope objected because the 
Bankruptcy Court had not determined ownership of the 
contents of the restaurant, although Phoenician claimed to 
own all of it. 
After learning from J & S’s principal, James Focht, 
that the restaurant had been shut down, that Phoenician had 
cancelled its insurance on the premises, and that heating the 
property could be an issue with an “anticipated arctic blast,” 
Swope met at the property with Phoenician’s principal, 
Husam Obeid, along with his counsel and a contractor on 
January 3, 2014. Id. At that meeting, Obeid gave Swope a key 
to the premises and the contractor recommended that the 
thermostat be set to at least “sixty degrees Fahrenheit to 
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prevent the pipes from freezing.” Phoenician Mediterranean 
Villa, LLC v. Swope, 554 B.R. 747, 750–51 (W.D. Pa. 2016). 
Unfortunately, Obeid did not heed this advice, the pipes burst, 
and the property was flooded on January 13, 2014. Obeid 
contacted a disaster restoration company, but they apparently 
refused to work on the property “because there were problems 
with insurance coverage, the relationship between the parties 
was acrimonious, and no one agreed to provide the company 
with a lien.” Id. at 751. According to Trustee Swope, Obeid 
and Focht “did not trust each other” and had previously tried 
to hurt each other’s businesses. Id. at 750. It was in this 
context that Swope set about to protect, or “adequately 
preserve[],” the largest asset of the bankruptcy estate. Id. 
Swope asked for another meeting on January 15, 2014 
to assess the damage to the property and discuss the status of 
the building’s insurance. Obeid and his counsel did not show 
up, asking that the meeting be rescheduled and held without 
Focht; Swope declined the request “[g]iven the urgent nature 
of the situation.” In re J & S Props., 545 B.R. at 95. Swope 
tried to inspect the premises but discovered the key Obeid had 
given her did not open the locked interior door to the 
building.1 Focht then “had the locks changed and provided 
Trustee Swope with the key” on January 16. Phoenician 
Mediterranean Villa, 554 B.R. at 751. Swope claimed in an 
email to Phoenician that in accepting control of the building, 
she was attempting to preserve the assets to the best of her 
                                                 
1 The Bankruptcy Court noted that “the Lease 
Agreement [between Phoenician and J & S] provides that 
Phoenician was required to provide the lessor with access to 
the premises so that it could be inspected and/or repaired.” In 
re J & S Props., 545 B.R. at 108 n.8. As such, Phoenician 
likely violated its lease. Id. 
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ability. On the same day, Swope filed an emergency motion 
asking the Bankruptcy Court to grant her immediate 
possession of the property and its contents. In the meantime, 
she retained the “sole key” and thus control of the premises, 
and subsequently provided both parties with only “supervised 
access” to the property. Id.  
Phoenician filed a complaint in equity to “regain 
possession of the premises,” and the Bankruptcy Court 
conducted an emergency hearing on January 24, 2014. 
Phoenician Br. 12.2 After the hearing, at which Swope 
testified, the Court denied Phoenician’s requests for an 
injunction and temporary restraining order on January 27. 
During the hearing, the Bankruptcy Court noted that “the 
trustee has possession, custody and control of the property,” 
and opined that Swope is “protected by the automatic stay,” 
which precludes Phoenician from interfering with the 
property in any way. App. 399. And on February 7, 2014, the 
Bankruptcy Court ordered that Phoenician and J & S and their 
associates “are prohibited from entering into or upon the 
[Estate] Property without the express authorization of the 
Trustee, or further order from this Court.” Order of Court 
Granting First Commonwealth Bank Relief from Stay 
(hereinafter “Feb. 7, 2014 Order”), Bankruptcy No. 13-
70512-JAD, ECF No. 113, at ¶¶ 7–8 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Feb. 7, 
2014). 
                                                 
2 The parties dispute whether Phoenician ever asked 
for and was denied access to the building between January 16 
(when the locks were changed) and January 24 (when the 
emergency hearing was held). The Bankruptcy Court found 
that resolution of the immunity issue did not require a 
resolution of this dispute, and so assumed that Phoenician had 
been denied access. See In re J & S Props., 545 B.R. at 95.   
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In its complaint, Phoenician also sued Swope under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 for wrongful eviction, claiming violations of 
its Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Swope moved 
to dismiss this suit based on quasi-judicial immunity. On 
September 30, 2015, the Bankruptcy Court granted Swope’s 
motion to dismiss the complaint against her, though because 
the Court looked to additional briefing and other hearings, the 
Court evaluated the motion under a summary judgment 
standard. See In re J & S Props., 545 B.R. at 95. It ultimately 
found that “no genuine dispute of material fact exists as to 
whether the Trustee exercised her business judgment as to the 
steps she deemed necessary to protect Estate Property,” and 
thus Swope was entitled to immunity. Id. at 96. 
On July 27, 2016, the District Court affirmed the 
Bankruptcy Court’s order granting Swope’s motion to 
dismiss. The District Court found that Swope was “entitled to 
qualified immunity” and that she did not engage in any 
wrongful or ultra vires conduct since she “took appropriate 
action to administer and preserve the Estate Property” in 
accordance “with her duties as the trustee.” Phoenician 
Mediterranean Villa, 554 B.R. at 756–57. 
Phoenician filed this timely appeal. 
II 
The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 157(a). The District Court exercised jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a). We have appellate jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). Like the District Court, we review 
the Bankruptcy Court’s legal determinations de novo and its 
factual findings for clear error. In re VistaCare Grp., LLC, 
678 F.3d 218, 224 (3d Cir. 2012). A factual finding is clearly 
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erroneous only if we are “left with the definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed.” In re W.R. 
Grace & Co., 729 F.3d 311, 319 n.14 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation 
omitted). 
III 
The principal issue on appeal is whether Swope is 
immune from Phoenician’s suit complaining of actions she 
took between January 16, 2014 and February 7, 2014.3 The 
                                                 
3 It appears undisputed that the Bankruptcy Court’s 
Order on February 7 provided Swope with absolute quasi-
judicial immunity for actions taken thereafter. That order 
explicitly allowed “changing all locks so that only the Bank 
and the Trustee have access to the Property,” Feb. 7, 2014 
Order, at ¶ 3, and prohibited Phoenician from entering 
“without the express authorization of the Trustee,” id. at ¶ 8. 
Because a trustee enjoys absolute immunity from liability 
when she carries out a bankruptcy court’s order, see In re 
Harris, 590 F.3d 730, 742 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding “derived 
quasi-judicial immunity” applies to trustees acting “pursuant 
to court order” (citation omitted)); Boullion v. McClanahan, 
639 F.2d 213, 214 (5th Cir. Unit A Mar. 1981) (per curiam) 
(listing cases so holding from the First, Second, Fourth, 
Eighth, and Tenth Circuits), and because the lower courts 
didn’t clearly err when they found Swope faithfully carried 
out the Bankruptcy Court’s February 7, 2014 Order, Swope is 
not amenable to suit for her later actions. 
While Phoenician doesn’t explicitly challenge Swope’s 
immunity after February 7, it does make passing complaints 
about the restrictive nature of Swope’s consent to enter the 
property on several dates after the Order. These criticisms are 
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Bankruptcy Court held that Swope is entitled to qualified 
immunity because she acted within her statutory duties and 
the District Court agreed, finding Swope did not violate 
clearly established law. We reach the same conclusion based 
on a straightforward application of Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 
U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
A 
 The Supreme Court held in Harlow that “government 
officials performing discretionary functions generally are 
shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their 
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known.” Id. But if such officials take actions in their official 
capacity which they “knew or reasonably should have known 
. . . would violate the [plaintiff’s] constitutional rights,” they 
are not entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 815 (emphasis 
and citation omitted).  
 It appears clear that Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Trustees 
like Swope are government officials for purposes of Harlow. 
                                                                                                             
ineffectual, however, because the terms of the Court’s Order 
gave Swope discretion over Phoenician’s ability to enter the 
property and the record indicates that Swope did allow 
Phoenician to enter the premises to remove its personal 
property several times. Although it was not entirely satisfied 
with the length of each visit or the items it was allowed to 
remove, Phoenician doesn’t point to evidence showing the 
lower courts clearly erred in finding these decisions 
consistent with the Court’s Order. 
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Phoenician does not dispute the finding of the lower courts 
that Swope is a public official generally entitled to qualified 
immunity. In fact, Phoenician claims that because “the 
Chapter 7 Trustee is appointed and supervised by the United 
States Trustee [and] is an officer of the appointing Court, . . . 
it is appropriate to apply Fourth Amendment limits on 
government power” to Swope. Phoenician Br. 22. Regardless 
of the Fourth Amendment analysis, Swope is a government 
official for purposes of immunity. The Chapter 7 Trustee is 
created by Congress, appointed by and “operating under the 
aegis of the U.S. Trustee,” and entrusted with the “statutory 
duties . . . to gather and liquidate the property of the estate, to 
be accountable for the estate, ensure that the debtor performs 
his or her obligations,” and “perform[] [other] adjudicatory 
and administrative functions.” In re Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 
950–51 (9th Cir. 2002). 
We thus hold that bankruptcy trustees are government 
officials, entitled under Harlow to qualified immunity from 
§ 1983 claims by third parties when they act in their official 
capacity in a manner that is not contrary to clearly established 
law. See 457 U.S. at 818 & n.30. 
B 
 Qualified immunity, “properly applied, . . . protects all 
but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate 
the law.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011) 
(citation omitted). “To overcome qualified immunity, a 
plaintiff must plead facts ‘showing (1) that the official 
violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the 
right was “clearly established” at the time of the challenged 
conduct.’” Mammaro v. N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & 
Permanency, 814 F.3d 164, 168–69 (3d Cir. 2016), cert. 
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denied, 137 S. Ct. 161 (2016) (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 
735). And an official’s conduct violates clearly established 
law if “there [is] sufficient precedent at the time of action, 
factually similar to the plaintiff’s allegations, to put defendant 
on notice that . . . her conduct is constitutionally prohibited.” 
McLaughlin v. Watson, 271 F.3d 566, 572 (3d Cir. 2001). 
Such precedent must come either from the Supreme Court or 
a “‘robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority’ in the 
Court of Appeals.” Mammaro, 814 F.3d at 169 (quoting 
Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015) (per curiam)). 
 In this case, Swope was not plainly incompetent and 
did not violate clearly established law. We agree with the 
Bankruptcy Court that there is a “dearth of case law on the 
topic” of whether a bankruptcy trustee may take control of a 
building which she is obliged to preserve and which is at 
imminent risk of destruction or damage, especially in the face 
of the lack of cooperation by a third-party tenant. In re J & S 
Props., 545 B.R. at 110.  
Rather than point to any case balancing a bankruptcy 
trustee’s duties to preserve the estate under her care in the 
face of “exigent circumstances” and her duties to a third-party 
tenant, id., Phoenician cites black-letter Pennsylvania law 
indicating that self-help eviction is generally impermissible. 
Because “[s]tate law defines property interests for purposes of 
procedural due process claims,” and Pennsylvania 
leaseholders are entitled to a trial before being evicted, 
Phoenician claims that it is clear that “self-help evictions are 
unlawful in Pennsylvania.” Phoenician Br. 20–21 (citing, e.g., 
Berman v. City of Philadelphia, 228 A.2d 189 (Pa. 1967)). 
Phoenician also argues that since Swope, as trustee of the 
property, “stands in the shoes of the landlord debtor,” Reply 
Br. 5, 8 (citing Hays & Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner 
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& Smith, Inc., 885 F.2d 1149, 1154 (3d Cir. 1989)), and the 
lease remained operative even after its rejection by the 
Bankruptcy Court, id. at 8 (citing 11 U.S.C. 
§ 365(h)(1)(A)(ii)), she constructively evicted Phoenician 
without due process when she received the only key to the 
building after the locks were changed. Phoenician adds that 
its inability to remove its personal items from the property 
after the locks were changed effected an impermissible 
seizure. 
 Phoenician’s thorough review of Pennsylvania law 
stands in stark contrast to its failure to acknowledge the many 
duties imposed upon Trustee Swope by federal bankruptcy 
law. Under 11 U.S.C. § 704, Swope had to safeguard, 
liquidate, and administer the estate property for the benefit of 
creditors. Section 704(a) states that the bankruptcy trustee 
“shall”: 
(1) collect and reduce to money the property of 
the estate for which such trustee serves, and 
close such estate as expeditiously as is 
compatible with the best interests of parties in 
interest; 
(2) be accountable for all property received[.] 
As the Bankruptcy Court noted, “there is no dispute” that 
Swope’s statutory duties “include protecting and preserving 
the Estate Property.” In re J & S Props., 545 B.R. at 108.  
 And the events of January 2014 required Swope to act 
to preserve the estate. Phoenician’s inaction caused 
significant flooding to the debtor’s estate and Swope did not 
have a key to access the building and survey the damage. She 
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accepted the key after the locks had been changed in order to 
fulfill her duty to preserve the property from further damage. 
Phoenician points to no case that addressed, much less 
established, whether such conduct by a trustee amounts to an 
unconstitutional eviction. In fact, the DOJ’s own guidance for 
bankruptcy trustees notes that for “cases where the property 
appears to have value for the estate, the trustee must obtain 
control over the property, which may include changing the 
locks at the premises . . . .” U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Executive 
Office for U.S. Trustees, Handbook for Chapter 7 Trustees, at 
§ 4.C.3.f (applying 11 U.S.C. § 704). The DOJ also notes that 
trustees “must immediately take all other steps which may be 
reasonably necessary to preserve the assets.” Id. Here, the 
Bankruptcy Court found, and the District Court agreed, that 
the imminent damage to the estate’s largest asset would 
reasonably lead a trustee in Swope’s position to believe that 
taking control of the property was not only permissible, but 
statutorily required. 
 The Supreme Court has cautioned that the question of 
“objective legal reasonableness” with respect to clearly 
established precedent should not be applied at too high a level 
of generality. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 
(1987). Phoenician makes that mistake by noting that its 
rights to due process of law and to be free of illegal seizure 
are “quite clearly established.” Id. But the existence of those 
clearly established rights sheds no light on whether Swope’s 
actions would violate them in the circumstances presented 
here. Id. at 640. The cases Phoenician cites do not approach 
the level of specificity required for clearly established law. 
For example, several of those cases have nothing to do with 
bankruptcy trustees, see Soldal v. Cook Cty., 506 U.S. 56 
(1992); Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 
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(1972); Ruiz v. New Garden Twp., 376 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 
2004), and the one case that does involve a trustee has 
nothing to do with a potential conflict between a landlord’s 
duties under state law and a trustee’s duty to preserve estate 
property under federal law. See Beard v. Braunstein, 914 F.2d 
434 (3d Cir. 1990).  
None of the cases upon which Phoenician relies 
involved a trustee attempting to preserve assets of an estate 
under her care in the face of past and future damage to those 
assets. And considering Phoenician’s lack of cooperation by 
giving Swope a key that only opened the outer door, its 
refusal “to keep the property adequately heated,” and its 
failure to meet at the property and maintain insurance, App. 
397, there is no law that clearly establishes the unlawfulness 
of Swope’s actions. Accordingly, we agree with the lower 
courts that “Swope, in accordance with her duties as the 
trustee, took appropriate action to administer and preserve the 
Estate Property.” Phoenician Mediterranean Villa, 554 B.R. 
at 756–57. This conclusion is fatal to Phoenician’s appeal. 
 It strains credulity to suggest, as Phoenician does, that 
“every reasonable official would have understood that what” 
Swope did constituted an impermissible eviction that violated 
due process. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741 (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted). “[W]here an official’s duties 
legitimately require action in which clearly established rights 
are not implicated, the public interest may be better served by 
action taken ‘with independence and without fear of 
consequences.’” Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819 (citation omitted); 
see also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). The 
circumstances of this case required Swope to act quickly to 
preserve the estate and she did so in a manner not contrary to 
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law. Accordingly, she should not be subject to suit for her 
actions.4 
C 
 Phoenician’s two remaining counterarguments are also 
unavailing. It first argues that the fact that Swope “filed her 
emergency motion for turnover and possession shortly after . . 
. lock[ing] the Phoenician out of the restaurant” (she got the 
key to the new locks on January 16 and filed on the same day) 
should be interpreted as an admission by Swope that a 
reasonable trustee would know she needed a court order for 
possession before accepting the new key. Phoenician Br. 26. 
This logic is faulty and would lead to undesirable outcomes. 
There are several other reasons Swope may have sought the 
Bankruptcy Court’s permission for these actions. As Swope 
argued, that a trustee seeks to have “her action ratified by a 
court, out of an abundance of caution, does not mean that she 
acts improperly” if she acts before the court could respond. 
Swope Br. 27. In this case, Swope claims she sought the 
emergency court order as quickly as possible, and accepted 
the new keys from the debtor only “because of the emergency 
need to preserve the estate’s largest asset” from water and 
other damage. Id.  
The Amici explain that bankruptcy trustees often seek 
post hoc court approval to ratify quick actions they take to 
preserve an estate based on exigent circumstances. If we were 
                                                 
4 Because we hold that Swope is entitled to qualified 
immunity, we need not address her contention that she is 
entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity for the actions 
she took before the Bankruptcy Court’s February 7, 2014 
Order. 
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to interpret this practice as an admission of wrongful 
behavior, it would upend years of custom and impair the 
ability of trustees to protect estates or encourage them to 
refrain from seeking court supervision of their actions. We 
eschew such undesirable results.  
Phoenician also claims that Swope “gave up her 
qualified immunity when she testified at the hearing on 
Phoenician’s request for a temporary restraining order.” 
Phoenician Br. 28. According to Phoenician, because 
“Trustee Swope never raised her immunity from suit at [the] 
hearing” on January 24, 2014, and instead “testified at that 
hearing with regard to the specific facts of the lockout,” she 
waived her right to claim immunity later. Phoenician Br. 22.  
It does not appear that Phoenician raised this argument 
in either the Bankruptcy Court or the District Court, see 
Swope Br. 26 (citing docket), so it is forfeited. See United 
States v. Joseph, 730 F.3d 336, 341–42 (3d Cir. 2013). In any 
event, the claim that Swope waived her immunity is not 
supported by legal authority. She was not put on notice as to 
any clear illegality at the emergency hearing; quite to the 
contrary, the Bankruptcy Court rejected Phoenician’s motion 
for an injunction and temporary restraining order after 
holding that Phoenician did not establish a likelihood of 
success on the merits. Moreover, Swope was not required to 
assert her right to qualified immunity at the January 24, 2014 
hearing since it was not a trial on the merits of Phoenician’s 
damages claims against Swope. The hearing was to adjudicate 
Phoenician’s motion for equitable relief and Swope’s 
emergency motion for control over the property. As such, 
there is no colorable argument of waiver here. 
 17 
 
IV 
 For the reasons stated, we will affirm the order of the 
District Court affirming the order of the Bankruptcy Court. 
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IN RE:  J & S PROPERTIES, LLC, Debtor 
 
PHOENICIAN MEDITERRANEAN VILLA, 
LLC, Appellant 
v. 
LISA M. SWOPE, Esquire, Trustee of the Bankruptcy Estate 
of J & S Properties LLC; JAMES FOCHT; J & S 
PROPERTIES, LLC 
No. 16-3366 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment. 
Bankruptcy trustees play a role in our federal judicial 
system rooted in centuries of Anglo-American bankruptcy law.  
Like their predecessors, modern-day trustees perform 
functions that are essential to the judiciary’s orderly 
disposition of a bankrupt’s estate.  I would hold that the 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee in this case (hereinafter Trustee) 
is immune from suit on the basis of quasi-judicial immunity.  I 
therefore agree with the majority that the judgment of the 
District Court should be affirmed.  In this separate opinion, I 
explain why, in my view, the doctrine of qualified immunity 
upon which the majority rests its decision is not properly 
before this Court, and then set forth my conclusion that the 
Trustee should be accorded quasi-judicial immunity. 
I 
Qualified immunity protects government officials 
“from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does 
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights 
of which a reasonable person would have known.”  Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).  “The presumption is that 
qualified rather than absolute immunity is sufficient to protect 
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government officials in the exercise of their duties.”  Burns v. 
Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486-87 (1991).  The Supreme Court has 
thus admonished that the extension of absolute immunity 
should be “quite sparing” and not extended “any further than 
its justification would warrant.”  Id. at 487.   
It is my respectful submission, however, that the 
Trustee’s Harlow qualified immunity defense is not adequately 
preserved for our consideration.  Qualified immunity “is an 
affirmative defense that must be pleaded by a defendant 
official.”  Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815.  The Supreme Court has 
therefore long held that “the burden of pleading it rests with 
the defendant.”  Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980) 
(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)); see also Crawford-El v. Britton, 
523 U.S. 574, 595 (1998); Thomas v. Independence Twp., 463 
F.3d 285, 293 (3d Cir. 2006).  As the majority recognizes, the 
Trustee failed to invoke Harlow qualified immunity before the 
Bankruptcy Court.  Quasi-judicial immunity is the only 
defense she pleaded.  While our cases permit a defendant to 
“raise qualified immunity as a defense at trial,” Sharp v. 
Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 168 (3d Cir. 2012), we have not 
allowed a defendant to raise Harlow qualified immunity for the 
first time on appeal.  And understandably so, since the 
Supreme Court has rejected efforts by courts to alter 
established rules of procedure in immunity cases.  See 
Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 594-97; Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 
304, 317-18 (1998); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics 
Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U. S. 163, 164-69 
(1993); Gomez, 446 U.S. at 639-40. 
As I read the opinions of the Bankruptcy Court and the 
District Court, neither decided this case on the basis of Harlow 
qualified immunity.  The Bankruptcy Court’s opinion does not 
cite any Harlow qualified immunity cases.  And while the 
District Court did reference Harlow’s standard once, that brief 
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mention appears only in the court’s description of Phoenician’s 
arguments on appeal.  See 554 B.R. 747, 755 (W.D. Pa. 2016) 
(“[Phoenician] argues that Trustee Swope is not entitled to 
qualified immunity because she violated its clearly established 
rights and because a reasonable Chapter 7 [t]rustee would have 
believed that evicting [Phoenician] from the restaurant without 
a court order violated its Fourth Amendment rights and 
deprived it of procedural due process.”).  The District Court 
instead cited two quasi-judicial immunity decisions—Antoine 
v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429 (1993), and In re 
Castillo, 297 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 2002)—for the proposition that 
such immunity “is historically accorded to trustees.”  554 B.R. 
at 756.  Though the Bankruptcy Court and District Court each 
stated that the Trustee “is entitled to qualified rather than 
absolute immunity” because she “did not act pursuant to a 
court order,” id.; see 545 B.R. 91, 113-14 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 
2015), that proposition simply refers to the fact that quasi-
judicial immunity can at times be qualified rather than 
absolute.  See 6 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 704.04[1], p. 704-13 
(Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2017) 
(“Trustees who act within the scope of the authority and 
discretion that they are given have been held entitled to quasi-
judicial immunity, and to the extent that they are executing 
orders of the court, they have been held entitled to absolute 
immunity.”) (footnote omitted). 
That quasi-judicial immunity can be qualified does not 
mean that Harlow qualified immunity is at issue.  Unlike quasi-
judicial immunity, Harlow qualified immunity is a 
contemporary doctrine.  In Harlow the Supreme Court 
“completely reformulated qualified immunity along principles 
not at all embodied in the common law, replacing the inquiry 
into subjective malice so frequently required at common law 
with an objective inquiry into the legal reasonableness of the 
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official action.”  Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 645 
(1987).  While quasi-judicial immunity is rooted in the 
common law, see infra Part II, Harlow qualified immunity is 
not.  A distinction between the two doctrines exists and it 
should be observed. 
Because neither the Bankruptcy Court nor the District 
Court decided this case on the basis of Harlow qualified 
immunity, the issue is not properly before us.  Like the 
Supreme Court, we are “a court of review, not first view.”  
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 718 n.7 (2005); see Wood 
v. Milyard, 566 U.S. 463, 473 (2012) (“[A]ppellate courts 
ordinarily abstain from entertaining issues that have not been 
raised and preserved in the court of first instance.”).  This 
precept applies as well in bankruptcy cases.  Our precedent 
instructs district courts to follow “the general rule that when a 
party fails to raise an issue in the bankruptcy court, the issue is 
waived and may not be considered . . . on appeal.”  In re Kaiser 
Grp. Int’l Inc., 399 F.3d 558, 565 (3d Cir. 2004).  I would 
therefore not absolve the Trustee of her obligation to raise 
Harlow qualified immunity before the Bankruptcy Court.   
II 
Whether or not the Trustee sufficiently preserved her 
Harlow qualified immunity defense, I believe this case should 
be decided based on the historical tradition of according quasi-
judicial immunity to bankruptcy trustees sued by third parties 
for actions taken within the scope of their official duties.   
It has long been understood that the various immunities 
from suit possessed by public officials at common law in 1871, 
the year Congress passed 42 U.S.C. § 1983, are retained in suits 
against state officials under that statute.  See, e.g., Tenney v. 
Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951); Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 
U.S. 356, 361-62 (2012).  The availability and scope of these 
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immunities is the same in actions brought against federal 
officials under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 
403 U.S. 388 (1971).  See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 
503-04 (1978).  Among the immunities firmly established in 
the common law is the absolute immunity judges enjoy for 
actions when carrying out their judicial functions.  See Bradley 
v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1872) (Describing 
judicial immunity as “the settled doctrine of the English courts 
for many centuries” that “has never been denied . . . in the 
courts of this country.”).  Pre-1871 common-law courts also 
extended quasi-judicial immunity to public servants 
performing “official acts involving policy discretion but not 
consisting of adjudication.”  Burns, 500 U.S. at 500 (Scalia, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).   
In Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, supra, the Supreme 
Court adopted a two-step approach for determining when 
quasi-judicial immunity attaches to the acts of officials other 
than judges who are involved in the judicial process.  First, 
“[i]n determining which officials perform functions that might 
justify full exemption from liability,” courts must undertake “a 
considered inquiry into the immunity historically accorded the 
relevant official at common law and the interests behind it.”  
Antoine, 508 U.S. at 432 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Next, courts must “consider whether judges, when performing 
that function, were themselves entitled to absolute immunity.”  
Id. at 435.  Stated differently, “judicial immunity is extended 
to officials other than judges” when “their judgments are 
functionally comparable to those of judges—that is, because 
they, too, ‘exercise discretionary judgment’ as part of their 
function.”  Id. at 436 (brackets omitted) (quoting Imbler v. 
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423 n.20 (1976)).  This approach 
accords with the “‘touchstone’” for the applicability of judicial 
immunity, namely, “‘the performance of the function of 
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resolving disputes between parties, or of authoritatively 
adjudicating private rights.’”  Id. at 435-36 (quoting Burns, 500 
U.S. at 500 (opinion of Scalia, J.)).  And while Antoine’s 
functional approach “is tied to the common law’s identification 
of the functions that merit the protection of absolute 
immunity,” the Supreme Court’s precedents “have not 
mechanically duplicated the precise scope of the absolute 
immunity that the common law provided to protect those 
functions.”  Rehberg, 566 U.S. at 364. 
Applying the analytical framework set forth in Antoine, 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustees should be accorded quasi-
judicial immunity for actions taken within the scope of their 
duties that are necessary to the bankruptcy court’s adjudication 
of a debtor’s estate.  The bankruptcy trustees of today perform 
quasi-judicial functions that trace back to their sixteenth-
century English predecessors.  England’s first bankruptcy laws 
were passed in 1542 and 1570.  See 34 & 35 Hen. 8 c. 4 (1542-
43); 13 Eliz. c. 7 (1570).  The latter statute “filled out the basic 
parameters of the English bankruptcy system . . . and remained 
in effect until the time of the American Revolution.”  Charles 
Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United 
States, 3 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 5, 8 (1995).  In addition to 
naming acts of bankruptcy, the law vested in the Lord 
Chancellor “power to appoint, by commission of the great seal, 
certain persons to exercise the powers of the Chancellor over 
the person and property of the bankrupt.”  8 William S. 
Holdsworth, A History of English Law 470 (3d ed. 1922).  
These commissioners “had substantial powers, originally akin 
to a combination of today’s trustee and bankruptcy judge.”  
Tabb, supra, at 8.  They supervised a process that “mirrored a 
modern straight liquidation case” wherein they would perform 
“normal trustee-like activities of collecting, liquidating, and 
distributing the debtor’s property to creditors, and more 
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traditional judicial activities, such as seizing property, 
summoning persons to appear before them, and committing 
people to prison.”  Id. at 8-9.  A statute of 1707, 4 Anne c. 17, 
delegated these trustee-like duties to assignees—so-called 
because they were assigned the bankrupt’s property.  See also 
Central Va. Community College v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 370 
(2006) (observing that English bankruptcy assignees were “the 
18th-century counterparts of today’s bankruptcy trustees”). 
Early American bankruptcy law followed the English 
system in many respects.  Though the Framers gave Congress 
the power to “establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of 
Bankruptcies throughout the United States,” U.S. Const. art I, 
§ 8, cl. 4, no permanent bankruptcy legislation existed until 
1898.  Temporary legislation was in place, however, from 1800 
to 1803, from 1841 to 1843, and from 1867 to 1878, each 
passed in the wake of a major financial panic.  At every step of 
the way, Congress retained the three-part English model: 
bankruptcy jurisdiction was placed in the district courts, those 
courts appointed commissioners (called “registers” in the 1867 
Act and “referees” in the 1898 Act) to assist the judges in 
executing their duties, and assignees would perform functions 
critical to the liquidation and distribution of the bankruptcy 
estate.  See Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 (repealed 
1803); Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 (repealed 1843); 
Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517 (repealed 1878); Act 
of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978). 
Another antecedent to the modern-day bankruptcy 
trustee can be found in the equity receivership commonly used 
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to assist 
with corporate reorganizations, especially with regard to 
struggling railroads.  See Tabb, supra, at 21-22.  As this Court 
has previously recognized, “[a] bankruptcy trustee is the 
‘statutory successor to the equity receiver’ and ‘just like an 
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equity receiver, a trustee in bankruptcy is working in effect’ for 
the court overseeing the bankruptcy proceeding, 
‘administering property that has come under the court’s control 
by virtue of the Bankruptcy Code.’”  In re VistaCare Grp., 
LLC, 678 F.3d 218, 229 (3d Cir. 2012) (brackets omitted) 
(quoting In re Linton, 136 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir. 1998)).  So 
to the extent equity receivers and nineteenth century assignees 
performed duties that required the exercise of discretionary 
judgment to assist courts in adjudicating bankruptcy-related 
disputes, they would have enjoyed quasi-judicial immunity 
from suit under the common law. 
The courts of appeals have uniformly held that the 
procedural and substantive immunities of equity receivers at 
common law carried over to the bankruptcy trustees of today.  
Thus, there is considerable acknowledgment that the common 
law procedural immunity known as the “Barton doctrine,” see 
Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126, 128-29 (1881), whereby an 
equity receiver could not be sued without leave of the court that 
appointed him, applies to the present-day bankruptcy trustee.  
See In re VistaCare Grp., 678 F.3d at 232; Carroll v. Abide, 
788 F.3d 502, 505 n.12 (5th Cir. 2015) (collecting cases from 
ten circuits).  Among the rationales courts have articulated in 
favor of the Barton doctrine is the “strong interest” “the court 
that appointed the trustee has . . . in protecting him from 
unjustified personal liability for acts taken within the scope of 
his official duties.”  In re Lehal Realty Assocs., 101 F.3d 272, 
276 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Vass v. Conron Bros. Co., 59 F.2d 
969, 970 (2d Cir. 1932) (L. Hand, J.) (“A trustee is equally an 
officer of the court; and [like a receiver] his possession is 
protected because it is the court’s . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
There is also a broad consensus that bankruptcy trustees 
are substantively immune from suit under the doctrine of quasi-
judicial immunity.  Generally speaking, there are “two types of 
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actions against trustees: breach of fiduciary duty claims 
brought by parties interested in the administration of the estate, 
and claims in tort or contract brought by third parties.”  In re 
Mailman Steam Carpet Cleaning Corp., 196 F.3d 1, 7 n.4 (1st 
Cir. 1999). It is settled that a bankruptcy trustee may be held 
personally liable for breach of fiduciary duty.  See Mosser v. 
Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 271, 274 (1951); In re McKenzie, 716 
F.3d 404, 413 (6th Cir. 2014); In re Mailman Steam Carpet 
Cleaning, 196 F.3d at 6-7.  Courts have also held that 
bankruptcy trustees are covered by quasi-judicial immunity 
when acting pursuant to an express court order.  See, e.g., In re 
Harris, 590 F.3d 730, 742 (9th Cir. 2009); Boullion v. 
McClanahan, 639 F.2d 213, 214 (5th Cir. Unit A Mar. 1981) 
(per curiam). 
Phoenician’s suit is of the second type, as it alleges no 
breach of fiduciary duty. Rather, Phoenician is a third party 
raising a claim sounding in tort.  In such cases, “a bankruptcy 
trustee is ordinarily entitled to quasi-judicial immunity from 
suit . . . for actions taken in his official capacity.”  In re 
McKenzie, 716 F.3d at 413; see In re Mailman Steam Carpet 
Cleaning, 196 F.3d at 7 n.4; Ziegler v. Pitney, 139 F.2d 595, 
596 (2d Cir. 1943); McRanie v. Palmer, 2 F.R.D. 479, 481 (D. 
Mass. 1942).  This immunity was recognized long ago in 
McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327 (1891), when the Supreme 
Court held that equity receivers cannot be held personally 
liable in suits by third parties—the suit instead can lie only 
against the receivership itself: 
So long as the property of the corporation remains in the 
custody of the court and is administered through the 
agency of a receiver, such receivership is continuous 
and uninterrupted until the court relinquishes its hold 
upon the property, though its personnel may be subject 
to repeated changes.  Actions against the receiver are in 
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law actions against the receivership, or the funds in the 
hands of the receiver, and his contracts, misfeasances, 
negligences and liabilities are official and not personal, 
and judgments against him as receiver are payable only 
from the funds in his hands. 
Id. at 332 (emphasis in original). 
While the quasi-judicial immunity of bankruptcy 
trustees does not extend to acts by a trustee that are ultra vires, 
see, e.g., Leonard v. Vrooman, 383 F.2d 556, 560 (9th Cir. 
1967), a bankruptcy trustee “is not required to obtain prior 
court approval in order to invoke quasi-judicial immunity from 
suit by a third party for actions taken by the trustee on behalf 
of the estate and within the scope of his authority.”  In re 
McKenzie, 716 F.3d at 414.  The Bankruptcy Court and the 
District Court thus drew an unnecessary distinction between 
“the absolute immunity analyses associated with actions taken 
pursuant to a court order [and] the qualified immunity analyses 
of actions undertaken absent an authorizing order of court.”  
545 B.R. at 104 (emphasis deleted); see 554 B.R. at 756.  As 
already noted, while it is true that a “trustee’s derivative 
judicial immunity is qualified” in certain respects, see 1 Joan 
N. Feeney et al., Bankruptcy Law Manual § 4:16, p. 799 (5th 
ed. 2016), the qualified nature of a bankruptcy trustee’s quasi-
judicial immunity is different from the doctrine of Harlow 
qualified immunity. 
Against this background, granting the Trustee quasi-
judicial immunity in this case is not a close call.  The Trustee’s 
efforts to secure the property of J & S’s estate—here, the real 
property leased to Phoenician—were discretionary actions 
performed within the scope of her statutory duties. The 
Bankruptcy Code requires Chapter 7 trustees to “collect and 
reduce to money the property of the estate for which such 
11 
 
trustee serves, and close such estate as expeditiously as is 
compatible with the best interests of parties in interest,” and, in 
connection with this responsibility, to “be accountable for all 
property received.”  11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(1), (2).  Both the 
Bankruptcy Court and District Court noted the undisputed fact 
that the Trustee’s duties included safeguarding the estate 
property.  See 545 B.R. at 108; 554 B.R. at 756.  Those courts 
therefore sensibly found that “a Chapter 7 [t]rustee has a duty 
to secure and preserve estate assets, including changing the 
locks to a building when circumstances warrant.”  545 B.R. at 
113; see 554 B.R. at 757. 
This conclusion is consistent with the guidance 
provided by the Department of Justice’s Office of the United 
States Trustee, which advises Chapter 7 trustees:  
In those cases where the property appears to have value 
for the estate, the trustee must obtain control over the 
property, which may include changing the locks at the 
premises, hiring guards, etc.  The trustee also must 
immediately take all other steps which may be 
reasonably necessary to preserve the assets. It is not 
always sufficient to wait until after the meeting of 
creditors to take action to preserve assets.  
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Handbook for Chapter 7 Trustees § 
4.C.3.f, p. 4-6 (2012) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 704).  Neither the 
Bankruptcy Code nor the Trustee Handbook specifies how 
trustees are to exercise their duty to safeguard estate property.  
A trustee must accordingly “exercise a discretionary judgment 
as part of th[is] function.” Antoine, 508 U.S. at 436 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  The Trustee is thus entitled to quasi-
judicial immunity for the discretionary acts she took in 
furtherance of her duty to safeguard the property of J & S’s 
estate. 
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* * * 
Because I would hold that the Trustee is shielded from 
liability under the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity, I concur 
in the judgment. 
